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THE DEATH OF A DOCTRINE: THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS AND RANDOM SUSPICIONLESS URINE DRUG
TESTS ERODING THE "SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE."
INTRODUCTION
Drug use has infiltrated almost all aspects of modern life.' Along
with its increase in use, the inherent dangers surrounding the drug culture
have also escalated. These inherent safety concerns include robberies,
assaults, discipline problems, and violence. The employment sector and
school sector are not immune to these problems, where absence, injuries,
and work tardiness are affected by drug use.2 The question that arises for
almost all employers or school superintendents is how to control or con-
tain the drug use and its dangers. Governments, employers, and school
superintendents have tried many techniques, including zero tolerance
policies, lectures on the evils of drugs, other presentations, and increas-
ing police presence.3 In recent years, another technique surfaced in an
effort to try to combat drug use: random urine drug screens.4 In the em-
ployment sector, the screens come in three forms: (1) pre-employment
drug screens; (2) post accident drug screens; and (3) random drug
screens. In the school setting, many tests happen during sports physicals,
as a disciplinary method, or randomly to a group of students.
Individuals and groups have challenged these drug tests as an un-
constitutional search under the protections of the Fourth Amendment,
both in the Supreme Court and in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
Although only one Supreme Court case concerning random suspicionless
drug testing has held the policy as unconstitutional,6 almost the exact
opposite result has happened in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.7
Drastically different results have been reached among the circuit courts
using similar logic and the same tests.'
Part one of this article discusses the general background of Fourth
Amendment law limited to the decreased requirement of probable cause
in administrative searches and the judicially created "special needs"
doctrine that eliminates a warrant requirement under certain circum-
stances. Part two discusses cases from both the Supreme Court and the
1. See Alex J. Barker, Vernonia School District 47J v. Action: Defining the Constitutional
Scope of Random Suspicionless Drug Testing in Interscholastic Athletics and Beyond, 5 WIDENER J.
PuB. L. 445, 446 (1996).
2. Id.
3. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Action, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
4. See Alex Barker, supra note 1, at 446.
5. See discussion infra Part 11.
6. See discussion infra note 199 and accompanying text.
7. See discussion infra Part III.
8. See discussion infra part M1.
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Tenth Circuit concerning random suspicionless drug testing. Part three
discusses the inconsistencies in the reasoning the Tenth Circuit has used
to hold the policies unconstitutional; determining that the special needs
doctrine has been effectively eliminated in the Tenth Circuit. Part four
concludes that only drug testing based on individualized suspicion, akin
to the decreased probable cause for administrative searches, will pass
constitutional muster in the Tenth Circuit.
I. SEARCH AND SEIZURE BACKGROUND
A. General Warrant Requirement
This section presents a brief contextual overview surrounding the
debate about the constitutionality of random suspicionless drug testing
protocols. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... 9 The
Fourth Amendment only protects individuals from governmental intru-
sion, not from private party actions. '° A court must address three ques-
tions when analyzing a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment: (1)
was there government action; (2) did the activity amount to a search; and
(3) was the search reasonable." If there was no governmental action, the
Constitution does not apply.' 2 If the activity was not a search, the Fourth
Amendment does not apply.'3 And if the search was reasonable, the
search was not unconstitutional."
1. Defining a Search and Reasonableness
If a court determines that the activity is a search, a rebuttable pre-
sumption exists that a warrantless search is unreasonable, unless there is
an exception to the warrant requirement.'" Consequently, defining what
actions constitute a search is very important to the outcome of the case.
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) ("[The Fourth Amendment] protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but the protections go further,
and often have nothing to do with privacy at all.").
11. See Amanda E. Bishop, Students, Urinalysis & Extracurricular activities: How
Vernonia's Aftermath is Trampling Fourth Amendment Rights, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 217, 233-34
(2000).
12. See Rachel L. Diehl, Constitutional Law - Search and Seizure - Random, Warrantless,
and Suspicionless Searches of Student Athletes Through Urinalysis Drug Testing by Public School
Officials Does Not Violate Fourth Amendment - Vernonia Sch. Dist. V. Action, 115 S. Ct 2386
(1995), 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 230, 230-31 n.6 (1996) (describing the "state action doctrine").
13. Id.
14. See Bishop, supra note 11, at 233-34.
15. See United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1986) (Warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within a carefully defined exception to the warrant
requirement.).
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In Katz v. United States,'6 the Supreme Court described the balanc-
ing test that courts should use to determine whether or not a search took
place. ,7 The test weighs the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy
from governmental intrusion against the government's interest in con-
trolling the activity.'
To determine the level of the expectation of privacy, courts look to
actions by the individual displaying a subjective belief of an expectation
of privacy.' 9 If the individual lacks a subjective expectation of privacy,
the inquiry ends and the activity does not amount to a search.20 If the
individual displays a subjective expectation of privacy, then the court
must determine whether a reasonable law-abiding person would expect
privacy in the same situation.2'
After confirming a reasonable expectation of privacy, courts deter-
mine the rationale of the specific governmental action.22 Courts consider
many factors: the need or interest for governmental intrusion, the ration-
ale behind the action, the actions of the individual governmental actor,
and other possible methods the government could have employed.23
After determining the expectation of privacy and the governmental
interest, the court employs a balancing test to determine the extent of the
invasion of the expected privacy to determine if the activity should be
defined as a search.24 The court balances the intrusiveness of the action
against whether or not the area deserves protection from government
intrusion.25
If the court considers the governmental activity a search, it is pre-
sumptively unreasonable without a warrant established on probable
cause. 26 This presumption can be overcome by any of the numerous ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement. Essential to the discussion of urine
drug testing are two exceptions, the administrative search exception and
the special needs doctrine. Both of these exceptions are discussed later
in this article.
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
18 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
19. See Note, Protecting Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 313, 317
(1981) (concluding that a more objective definition of privacy is needed for an effective yet fair
application of the Fourth Amendment in the privacy context).
20. See id. at 327.
21. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347. 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
22. See id. at 362.
23. Keith S. Berets, The Boiling Frog: Privacy Rights Hang in the Balance in Vernonia
School District v. Action, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 1101, 1101 (1996).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 1102.
26. See Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d at 297.
27. Id.
28. See discussion infra Parts lI.A, 1.B.
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2. Probable Cause and Warrant Requirements
As noted above, the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause in
order to issue a warrant. 29 For police to obtain a search, seizure, or arrest
warrant, they must appear before a neutral judge or magistrate and estab-
lish probable cause based on the facts of the case.30 Probable cause does
not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the level of proof required
at a criminal trial; rather, it only requires evidence of probability of
wrongdoing.' In addition, proof of probable cause allows use of evi-
dence not normally admissible at trial, including hearsay and prior bad
acts.32 Because probable cause represents a probability rather than an
absolute, a good faith exception exists for warrants issued on faulty
33probable cause.
Probable cause to search differs from probable cause to seize or
probable cause to arrest. 3 Probable cause to search requires evidence that
the items the police seek relate to the criminal activity. 35 Furthermore,
these items must be in the place the police intend to search.36 Probable
cause to seize only requires evidence that the items the police seek to
seize relate to the criminal activity.37 Probable cause to arrest requires
evidence of a criminal offense and that the individual the police intend to
arrest committed that offense.38
If no initial ruling on probable cause exists prior to the search, sei-
zure, or arrest, and if a judge rules against probable cause after the fact,
and if none of the various exceptions apply, the search, seizure, or arrest
violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the individual.3 9 The exclusion-
ary rule bars the admittance of evidence gained through an illegal search
or seizure and serves as a deterrent to illegal police activity.4°
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30. See Peter J. Kocaras, Proper Appellate Standard of Review for Probable Cause to Issue a
Search Warrant, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1413, 1418 (1993).
31. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213. 232 (1983) ("[Plrobable cause is a fluid concept -
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts.").
32. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412 (1969) ("the constitutional requirements
of probable cause can be satisfied by hearsay information.") (overruled on other grounds).
33. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (establishing a "good faith" exception to
faulty warrants).
34. See Frederick Alexander & John L. Amsden, Scope of the Fourth Amendment, 75 GEO.





39. Id. at 725.
40. See Edward R. Glady, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule, 71 GEO. L.J. 434, 435 (1982).
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B. Relevant Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement for Suspicionless
Urine Drug Tests
1. Administrative Search's Relaxed Probable Cause
Administrative searches are conducted by administrative agencies,
whose actions rise to the level of the definition of a search in Katz.
41
These searches typically originate as non-criminal in nature, but the
fruits of the search can be used in a criminal trial. 2 In themselves, ad-
ministrative searches are not outside of the warrant requirement.4 '3 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has relaxed the probable cause standard in ad-
ministrative searches to a point well below the level required to establish
probable cause in the criminal context."
The leading case, Camara v. Municipal Ct. of the City and County
of San Francisco," established this relaxed standard.4
a. Facts
Municipal building inspectors were going from house to house con-
ducting inspections of apartments for building code violations that could
pose safety concerns, including residential occupancy in areas forbidden
by permit.47 An individual refused the inspector entry into his residence.f
After repeatedly refusing subsequent searches, he was fined and crimi-
nally punished for his refusal to abide by the building inspector's re-
quests to search pursuant to the inspector's authority under the housing
code.49 The individual filed a writ of prohibition based on a violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights.5
The City argued that the inspections were narrowly tailored for the
least possible demand on individuals. 5' The City also argued that at all
times the inspectors acted reasonably, satisfying the reasonableness re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment.12 The City argued that a warrant
requirement was an impossible obstacle in these particular inspections
41. See Sunil H. Mansukhani. School Searches after New Jersey v. T.LO.: Are There any
Limits?, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 345, 352 (1996).
42. Id.
43. Id at 353.
44. See id.
45. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
46. Camara v. Municipal Ct. of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 535
(1967).
47. Camara, 387 U.S. at 526.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 527.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 531.
52. Id.
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because they were inspecting large areas based on legislative assessment
of various factors. 3
b. Analysis
Initially, the Court ruled that it was overruling previous precedent,5
which held that regulatory searches that are essentially civil, limited in
scope, and not exercised under unreasonable conditions were constitu-
tionally valid.5' The Court ruled that routine inspections for health and
safety were not as intrusive as a search by a policeman, but that the
Fourth Amendment's protections still applied.5 6 Part of the ruling relied
on the fact that criminal charges could come from the civil inspection,
including code violations and criminal penalties for non-compliance with
the search 7 Secondly, the individual had no way of knowing if the in-
spector's demands to search were valid, and to what extent the search had
been administratively authorized. 8 This meant that there was a large
amount of government discretion, the type of discretion the Fourth
Amendment was meant to curtail. 59
The Court next considered the argument that public safety justified
the search under the reasonableness requirement even absent a warrant.6°
The Court dismissed this argument, stating that the question is whether
the authority to search should be supported by a warrant, not whether the
public interest justifies the search.6' In addition, the warrant requirement
should be concerned with whether obtaining a warrant would frustrate
the purpose behind the search.62
After concluding that the Fourth Amendment bound the search in
question, the Court next looked to the level of suspicion required in order
for the government to obtain a warrant, probable cause or something
less.63 This was in turn an analysis of reasonableness, balancing the gov-
ernmental interest and the privacy intrusion.6
The Court held that the agency would have to get a warrant, but not
a warrant based on the probable cause standard traditionally used in law
enforcement. Officials would not have to "show the same kind of proof
53. Camara, 387 U.S. at 532.
54. Id. at 528.
55. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
56. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
57. Id. at 531.
58. Id. at 532.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 533.
61. Id.
62. Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
63. Id. at 534.
64. Id. at 534-35.
65. Id. at 532-33.
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to a magistrate to obtain a warrant as one must who would search for the
fruits or instrumentalities of crime."' The Court concluded that the ulti-
mate standard was reasonableness, 7 balancing the governmental interest
that allegedly justifies the intrusion with the scope of the intrusion on
individual's privacy.68 This relaxed standard of probable cause also ap-
plied to the determination of reasonableness of warrantless searches, thus
providing both a relaxed definition of probable cause to get a warrant,
and relaxing the standard of reasonableness applied to warrantless
searches.69
c. Holding
Administrative searches are typically broad, suspicionless searches,
searching broader areas than a typical criminal, for example the building
code compliance in a block, and this type of search has a decreased stan-
dard of probable cause - the standard of reasonableness.7°
2. Special Needs Doctrine as an Exception to Warrant Requirement
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 7 ' has been cited as the birth of the "special
needs" doctrine.72 The Supreme Court established an exception to the
warrant requirement when there is a special need beyond that of law en-
forcement that justified warrantless searches.73 The special needs analysis
balances the legitimate expectation of privacy with the interest of the
government to establish an exception to the warrant requirement.74
a. Facts
A high school teacher found a 14-year-old student smoking on
school property, which violated local school rules. 7 The teacher took the
76student to the vice principal, and the student denied ever smoking. Then
the vice principal opened the student's purse and discovered a pack of
cigarettes and some cigarette rolling paper." This prompted him to
search her purse more thoroughly. 78 His search revealed substantial evi-
dence that the student was involved in dealing marijuana to other stu-
66. Id. at 538.
67. Id.
68. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
69. Id. at 539.
70. Id. at 539.
71. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
72. See Michael S. Vaughn & Rolando V. del Carmen, "Special Needs" in Criminal Justice:
An evolving Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements, 3
GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 203, 209 (Spring 1993).
73. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985).
74. See Vaughn, supra note 72, at 209.
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dents.79 At no time did the school obtain a warrant for the search."0
Criminal delinquent charges were filed against the student and she




Initially, the Court determined that school officials had to comport
with the Constitution,82 and in particular the Fourth Amendment, 3 and
that the actions of the school principal or administrators were govern-
ment actionm In addition, it was beyond dispute that the opening and
removing the contents of the purse was a search because of the high ex-
pectation of privacy in a closed purse. The case then turned to the ques-
tion of the reasonableness of the warrantless search8 6
The Court ruled that students had an expectation of privacy and had
not waived their right to privacy by being on school property. However,
the Court stated that school officials had a legitimate need to maintain an
atmosphere promoting learning and this required easing the restrictions
of search and seizure law applying to law enforcement.88
The Court concluded that school officials did not need to obtain
warrants to search for drugs because of the particular circumstances of
the school environment, 9 and that relaxed standards applied to probable
cause for administrative searches.9 The Court only required an estab-
lishment of individualized suspicion, suspicion that the individual has
violated a school rule or the law. 9' Since there was reasonable individu-
alized suspicion, the school official did not have to obtain a warrant to
make the search reasonable. 92
The constitutionality of the search of a student, the Court ruled,
should depend simply on the reasonableness of the search, considering
the totality of the circumstances.93 This includes whether the search was
79. Id.
80. Id. at 328-29.
81. T.LO., 469 U.S. at 329.
82. Id. at 333.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 337-38.
86. Id. at 337.
87. T.LO., 469 U.S at 334.
88. Id. at 341.
89. Id. at 343.
90. Id. at 340.
91. Id. at 341.
92. Id. at 343.
93. T.LO., 469 U.S at 341.
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justified at its inception,9" and whether the search relates in scope to the
justification for the search.95
The Court defined justification at the inception as reasonable
grounds to suspect that the search would reveal evidence that the student
had violated either the law or the school rules. 96 This individualized sus-
picion was a relaxed standard compared to probable cause.97
Justice Blackmun stated, "Only in those exceptional circumstances
in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable, is a
court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Fram-
ers. ' Accordingly, many credit this as the birth of the "special needs
doctrine.,99
c. Holding
A search of a student's purse was constitutional because there was a
special need, beyond law enforcement, that justified the warrantless
search as reasonable. °°
II. SUSPICIONLESs DRUG TESTS IN THE COURTS
A. The Supreme Court's Approach to Suspicionless Drug Testing
1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' °'
The first case in which the Supreme Court addressed random suspi-
cionless urine drug testing of employees was Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association. 102 Skinner established the precedent that urine
collection for drug testing was a search and demanded the protections of
the Fourth Amendment.' 3 It also began the development of the "special
needs" doctrine as it applied to drug tests, beyond the search of purses in
T.L.O.1°4
94. Id. at 341-42.
95. Id. at 342.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 333.
98. See id. at 351-52.
99. See Bill 0. Heder, The Development of Search and Seizure Law in Public Schools, 1999
B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 71,75 (1999).
100. T.LO., 469 U.S. at 347-48.
101. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
102. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
103. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
104. Id. at 619.
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a. Facts
Labor union representatives brought an action challenging random
suspicionless drug testing done by the Federal Railroad Administration
("FRA").' °5 The FRA promulgated a rule requiring that after certain types
of railroad accidents, employees had to consent to either blood or urine
drug and alcohol testing. '°6 In addition, another rule authorized, but did
not require, urine or breath alcohol and drug tests after individuals vio-
lated certain safety rules.
0 7
Testing was completed by an outside agency using "state of the art
equipment and techniques."'' ° Both blood and urine were collected after
major accidents. °9 Employees were notified of the test results and given
an opportunity to respond."0 Urine and breath tests could also be con-
ducted after accidents when there was reasonable individualized suspi-
cion, or where certain rules were violated."'
The FRA pointed to numerous accidents caused by drug or alcohol
impairment of employees, and described the type of workers covered
under the rules as safety sensitive."2 In addition, they stated that the rea-
son for the testing was deterrence from drug and alcohol use during work
and that test results would not be divulged to criminal authorities without
the employee's consent. '13
The labor union countered that the collection of blood, urine, or
breath constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment and employees'
right to be free from governmental intrusion."4 In addition, they argued
that the policy was not an effective deterrent and therefore did not ade-
quately fulfill its stated purpose.115
b. Analysis
The Court first had to decide whether there was state action impli-
cating the protections of the Fourth Amendment." 6 The FRA argued that
because an outside private company collected and tested the urine or
blood, there was no state action."7 Consequently, because private actors
105. Id. at 612.
106. Id. at 606.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 610.
109. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609.
110. Id. at 610.
111. /d. at 611.
112. Id. at 607.
113. Id. at 620-21 n.5.
114. Id. at 612.
115. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 630 (inferred for Court's discussion of deterrent effect of policy).
116. Id. at 614.
117. Id. at 615.
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are not bound by the Constitution, there could not be a violation of the
Constitution."8
The Court rejected this argument.' 9 They applied the state action
doctrine, ' 2 stating that private party action can amount to state action
under certain situations.' 2' Because the FRA was a governmental agency,
and required the tests, and the private medical company acted on behalf
of the governmental agency, state action existed.'
22
The next question the Court had to answer was whether collecting
and testing urine amounted to a search that should be protected under the
Fourth Amendment.'23 In previous decisions, the Court had stated that the
collection of blood using a surgical technique (using a needle to with-
draw blood from a person's body) was a search under the Fourth
Amendment,' 24 but the Court had not previously decided on the collection
of urine using non-surgical techniques.'2 The Court determined that there
was a very high expectation of privacy in bodily functions,'26 and the
collection of such violated that expectation. 27 In addition, the Court
stated that this expectation was reasonable.' 28 Balancing this with the
government's interest, the Court concluded that the collection of urine for
urine drug tests was a search within the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. 
29
The Court also considered whether the search was reasonable with-
out a warrant based on probable cause or individualized suspicion. '' The
Court applied the special needs doctrine, developed in T.L.O., to con-
clude that the FRA did not need a warrant. 3' The search was beyond
normal law enforcement and justified a departure from the usual warrant
and probable cause requirements because: (1) a warrant would do little to
further the protections of the Fourth Amendment; 3 2 (2) the burden of
obtaining a warrant was likely to frustrate the purpose behind the
search;'3 3 and (3) the FRA had little occasion to become familiar with the
118. Id. at 614.
119. Id. at 615.
120. See Diehl, supra note 12, at 230-31 n.6 (1996) (describing the "state action doctrine").
121. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 617.
124. Id. at 616. See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (holding blood
collection as a search).
125. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 617.
128. Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th
Cir. 1987)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 621.
131. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
132. Id. at 622.
133. Id. at 623.
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subtle nuances of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.'" In addition, the
special need for safety while operating trains was demonstrated by the
dramatic figures that the FRA provided.'35
The Court then balanced governmental interest with the privacy
intrusion to determine reasonableness and justification for the suspicion-
less search. 36 Because of the number of accidents detailed by the FRA,
and the safety sensitive nature of the position of the railroad workers, the
government's interest was compelling. 37 In addition, because the railroad
workers worked in a highly regulated industry, they had a decreased ex-
pectation of privacy. 3 ' The Court held that the balance decidedly tipped
in favor of the FRA conducting drug testing without a warrant.
39
c. Holding
Urine alcohol and drug tests are searches within the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement. 4 0 It is reasonable to conduct
such tests for drug use in the absence of a warrant or individualized sus-
picion of a particular employee because of the "special needs" balancing
in favor of the FRA. '' Consequently, the alcohol and drug tests contem-
plated by the FRA's regulations are reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.'
4 2
2. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab
43
In a companion case decided the same day as Skinner, the Court
upheld another suspicionless drug test without any showing of a drug
problem or the concrete showing of danger that had been emphasized in
Skinner.'44
a. Facts
The United States Custom Service implemented a random suspi-
cionless drug testing policy.'4 5 The policy covered three categories of
employees: (1) those who had direct involvement in drug interdiction or
134. Id. at 623.
135. Id. at 630.
136. Id. at 626-30.
137. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.
138. Id. at 627.
139. Id. at 633.
140. Id. at 617.
141. id. at 633.
142. ld. at 633.
143. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
144. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
145. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660.
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enforcement; (2) those who carried firearms; and (3) those who handled
classified information. 1 46
Testing was strictly completed with a same sex individual standing
outside a closed bathroom stall, dye in the toilet to assure water is not put
in the sample, listening for normal sounds of urination, measuring the
temperature of the sample, and sealing the sample.4 4 Analysis of the
urine was done confidentially, and results were not released to anyone
outside of the agency without the individual's consent, including law
enforcement personnel' 8
The Custom Service stated that there were no known significant
drug problems to date,' 9 but that the positions were very safety
sensitive,5 highly susceptible to illegal influence, 5 ' and employees could
be dangerous to the public if the employees used drugs because they car-
ried firearms and were the first line of defense in drug trafficking for the
United States.'52 In addition, there was minimal, if any, day to day super-
vision that would enable the Service to establish individualized suspi-
cion.'53
b. Analysis
The Court noted that this case had been decided on the same day as
Skinner, and as such, they quickly concluded that there was government
action and that it did amount to a search. 1 The Court also noted that it
was not disputed that this testing policy was not for law enforcement
purposes and thus possibly fell within the special needs doctrine.'15 The
Court then looked to exceptions for the warrant requirement to determine
the reasonableness of the search.'
56
The Court concluded that the Customs agents were probably more
familiar with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,' 7 as opposed to the FRA
in Skinner, but that a warrant requirement in the instant case would divert
valuable resources away from the Service's primary mission." Secondly,
a warrant requirement would do little to increase the protections required
by the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. 9
146. Id. at 660-61.
147. Id. at 661.
148. ld. at 661-62.
149. Id. at 660, 673.
150. Id. at 660-61.
151. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 661.
152. Id. at 670-71.
153. Id. at 674.
154. Id. at 665.
155. Id. at 665-66.
156. Id. at 666.
157, Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666.
158. Id. at 666-67.
159. Id. at 667.
20021
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The Court briefly referred to the point that the testing was not ran-
dom, per se, because the employees knew when the testing would occur,
who was covered, and there was no discretion on the part of the agency
in who was tested.' 6° This increased the government's interest and de-
creased the individual's expectation of privacy.6 '
The Court extolled the virtues of the testing program's stated pur-
poses, and how important it was to have drug free agents doing the valu-
able job of the Custom Service. 62 This indicated a very important gov-
ernmental interest.'6 In addition, there was great public interest in insti-
tuting effective measures to prevent individuals who carry firearms from
using drugs.' 64
In contrast to these interests was the employee's expectation of pri-
vacy.' 65 The Court noted that occasionally there were reasonable searches
in the workplace where in other contexts it would not be considered rea-
sonable, and that this lowered the individual's expectation of privacy in
the workplace.'" The Court concluded that agents could not reasonably
expect to keep the Service from gaining personal information that bears
directly on job fitness, and urine drug tests provided this type of infor-
mation. 167 Finally, the employees had notice about the tests decreasing
their expectation of privacy." Consequently, the individuals' privacy
interest did not outweigh the governmental interest.' 69
Next, the Court looked to the scope of the drug testing protocol.
70
They concluded that despite evidence that there was a minimal drug
problem at the Service, the deterrent effect was very important.' The
Court concluded that American workplaces were not immune from "one
of the most serious problems confronting our society today," drug
abuse. 172 Therefore, the Service did not have to establish a real special
need; the deterrent effect and the possibility of harm to the public were
sufficient.'
7
Consequently, Von Raab did not require the same showing as re-
quired in Skinner, that there was a drug problem causing accidents and
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 668-70.
163. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670.
164. Id. at 670-71.
165. Id. at 671.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 672
168. Id. at 672, fn. 2.
169. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672.
170. Id. at 674.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 674.
173. Id. at 674-75.
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Suspicionless testing of Custom Service agents who carried firearms
or who were directly involved in drug enforcement was reasonable
within the Fourth Amendment and did not require a warrant, probable
cause, or individualized suspicion, because of the application of the spe-
cial needs doctrine. 175 In light of this holding, the remainder of the case
was remanded to the lower court to determine if individuals who were in
contact with confidential communications were also in a position that
required the application of the special needs doctrine.
76
3. Vernonia School District 471 v. Acton'
77
Several years later, the Court again had an opportunity to evaluate
random suspicionless urine drug testing, this time in the context of
schools, and again upheld the policy as constitutional .
a. Facts
Vernonia School District 47J (the "District") required random urine
drug testing for all students involved in after school athletics. 7 Urine
samples were tested for a variety of drugs, including stimulants, cocaine,
and THC.' s° Other drugs, including alcohol and LSD, could be tested for
on request, but the identity of the student did not determine which tests
were conducted.' School officials rigidly conducted the tests, with the
administrator outside of the stall while the person being tested was inside
the stall. 2 The specimen was sent to an outside agency for anonymous
testing."3 Results were mailed only to the superintendent and not di-
vulged to the police) 84
The District detailed how drugs had created disciplinary problems,
and that other efforts, including special classes, guest speakers, the pres-
ence of drug sniffing dogs, and various other presentations, had not
stemmed the drug problem.' The District's showing had the same pur-
174. See id.
175. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677.
176. Id. at 678 (The district court held that the testing of employees who had access to top
secret information was reasonable. See 756 F.Supp. 947 (E.D.La. 1991)).
177. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
178. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995).
179. Vernonia 515 U.S. at 648.
180. Id. at 650.
181. Id. at 651.
182. Id. at 650.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 651.
185. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649.
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pose as the showing used by the FRA in Skinner, to establish a special
need.
The District had determined that the athletes were the core of the
drug culture, and that drugs negatively affected the athletes' abilities by
decreasing motivation, memory, judgment, reaction time, and coordina-
tion.16 Because of these effects, athletes were a threat to themselves and
others as injuries were more likely during athletic competitions and
practices when athletes were on drugs. 87 As a result, the drug testing
program was narrowly tailored to test only athletes, not the entire student
body, to affect the core of the drug culture, thus affecting all of the drug
culture. "g
If the superintendent received a positive drug test result, a second
test was conducted to confirm the results. 9 If the second test was posi-
tive, the parents of the student were notified for a meeting with the prin-
cipal.' 90 During that meeting, the student had the option to enter counsel-
ing or to be removed from the athletic team for the current year and the
following year. 9' If the second test was negative, the first test was dis-missed. '9
b. Analysis
There was minimal discussion, or real question, about whether the
school actions amounted to government action, or whether the action
constituted a search. 193 Skinner and T.L.O. had decidedly answered both
of these questions. The only question remaining was the reasonableness
of the warrantless search.'19
The Court held that the student athletes had a much lower expecta-
tion of privacy because they were students.'95 In addition, they showered
and changed clothes together in the locker room,' 96 they were subject to
physical exams prior to the start of the season,197 and they knew that, as
students, they had a decreased expectation of privacy because they had to
comport with strict regulations for after school athletics.' 98
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 649-50.
189. Id. at 651.
190. Id.
191. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 651.
192. Id. at 651.
193. Id. at 652.
194. Id. at 652-53.
195. Id. at 657.
196. Id.
197. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657.
198. Id.
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On the other hand, the school had a great interest in controlling the
drug problem because the problem was "epidemic,"' 99 drug use led to
drastic discipline problems,2°° the athletes could hurt themselves or others
when playing sports on drugs, 20 ' and the athletes were role models for
other students.202 The District had established a real need that was beyond
normal law enforcement purposes, and accordingly, the Court applied the• 201
special needs doctrine.
Next, the Court looked to the intrusiveness of the test and the scope
of the drug testing policy.20 The Court held that the test was relatively
unobtrusive.2 5 In addition, because the policy only covered athletes who
appeared to be role models and the core of the drug culture the Court
held that the policy was not overbroad. °9
Applying the special needs doctrine, the Court balanced the expec-
tation and nature of the privacy interest, the type of intrusion, and the
governmental concern. 7 The Court concluded that the governmental
purpose severely outweighed the students' expectation of privacy.28
c. Holding
Random suspicionless drug testing of students participating in after
school athletics as a condition of participation is constitutional and does
not violate the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable• 209
searches and seizures.
4. Chandler v. Miller
20
Chandler v. Miller is the most recent application of the special
needs doctrine to random suspicionless drug testing policies by the Su-
preme Court. This case differs from the previous three because it held the
drug testing policy unconstitutional. 2 ' The Court chose not to apply the
special needs balancing test because the City had not established the
elements of the doctrine.
199. Id. at 649.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 663.
203. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653.
204. Id. at 663.
205. Id. at 664-65.
206. Id. at 663.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665.
210. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
211. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997).
212. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319.
20021
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a. Facts
The Georgia State Legislature passed a law requiring any individual
who was running for a high office to submit to and pass a urine drug
screen. " High office positions consisted of the Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General and District Attorneys,
School Superintendent, Commissioner of Insurance, Agriculture, and
Labor, Justices and Judges, and members of the General Assembly and
Public Service Commission.214
Results of urine drug screens were to be provided by the candidate
30 days prior to qualifying for nomination or election.1 5 The tests were
arranged by the candidates and could be taken at a number of medical
facilities, including the candidate's private physician." 6 Release of results
was in the sole discretion of the candidate, and criminal authorities did
not receive positive results.2 7 Procedures of the tests were to be regulated
by federal statute.28
The State argued that it had a significant interest in assuring that
candidates were drug free because of the position the candidates could
hold, public impression of a drug free government, and that the individu-
als needed to be clear headed in the performance of their job duties.2 9
Three candidates from the Libertarian party challenged the statute as
violating the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.2
b. Analysis
It was beyond doubt by this point in precedent that there was state
action, and that the collection of urine for drug testing constituted a
search. 2 So the remaining issue was whether the search was reasonable
without a warrant and without individualized suspicion.2
Initially, the State argued that the Tenth Amendment allowed them,
under their sovereign power, to establish qualifications for holding a
state office.223 However, the Court dismissed this argument, stating that
213. Id. at 308.
214. Id. at 309-10.
215. Id. at 309.
216. Id. at 310.
217. Id. at 312.
218. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 310.
219. Id. at 318.
220. Id. at 310.
221. Id. at 313.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 317.
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sovereign power did not release the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment ' and thus the case turned on the reasonableness of the search.2
4
The Court next looked to the special needs doctrine.226 After evalu-
ating the precedents of Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia, the Court ana-
lyzed whether there was a special need demonstrated in the instant case
to relax the warrant requirement.227
The Court noted that there was no known or demonstrated drug
problem for the group being tested.) In addition, there was no demon-
stration that there was a concrete danger demanding the application of
relaxed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 229 Also, the scope of the stat-
ute was not well designed to identify individual drug users.20 Because
the candidates could arrange the test themselves, could only release
negative results without disclosing any positive results, and could cir-
cumvent the protections by abstaining from drugs, the policy would not
work to fulfill its stated purpose.3
The Court distinguished the present case from Von Raab, where
there was a showing of a real need, because the individuals in that case
232carried weapons and were the front line defense for the United States.
In the instant case, there was no similar danger.233 In addition, the Cus-
toms Officers in Von Raab were not subject to day-to-day scrutiny,
whereas public officials, or candidates, were subject to heavy scrutiny
from both their coworkers and the public, which could establish reason-
able individualized suspicion.234
Consequently, the State had not shown a real need that required
loosening the protections of the Fourth Amendment to necessitate that
the state could conduct suspicionless, warrantless searches.233
c. Holding
As a threshold matter, the special needs doctrine would only apply
if a real need or a severe public threat was demonstrated.2 36 Because the
state had not established a real need, the special needs doctrine did not
apply.137 Random suspicionless urine drug testing of state office candi-
224. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 317.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 318.
227. Id. at 321.
228. Id. at 31R-19.
229. Id.
230. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319.
231. id. at 320.
232. Id. at 320-21.
233. Id. at 321.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 322.
236. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322.
237. Id.
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dates was an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment be-
cause the state had not shown a special need to allow warrantless
searches without suspicion.238
B. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Approach to Suspicionless Drug
Testing
1. Rutherford v. Albuquerque1
31
Rutherford was one of the first Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sions concerning random suspicionless drug testing. This case was prior
to Chandler, and relied heavily on Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia to
establish the requirements of the special needs doctrine as it applied to
random suspicionless drug testing. 24°
a. Facts
Rutherford, the plaintiff, had been on physical layoff status as a bus
driver' from a work related back injury and a heart attack.242 During his
absence, the City had initiated a drug testing policy that provided for
drug testing as a prerequisite to obtaining a city operator's permit, and/or
as a condition of beginning employment with the City.
23
Rutherford was unaware of this policy when he was cleared to go
back to work.2" He went back to work with the City as a truck driver for
the public works department, a position that requires a city operator's
permit. 245 Rutherford's city operator's permit had not expired from his
previous job.2 6
When he arrived for work, the City sent him to the employee health
center for a drug test. 47 The drug test was positive for marijuana, and
Rutherford admitted to smoking marijuana.24 As a result of the positive
test, the admission, and other no tolerance policies, the city terminated
his employment. 249 He brought this action claiming a violation of his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and sei-
250zures.
238. Id. at 323.
239. 77 F.3d 1258 (1996).
240. Rutherford v. Albuquerque, 77 F.3d 1258, 1259 (1996).
241. Rutherford, 77 F.3d at 1259.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1261.
245. Id. at 1259.
246. Id.
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b. Analysis
First, the Tenth Circuit quickly concluded that there was state ac-
tion, as the government acting as an employer is bound by the constitu-
tion,' ' and that the collection of urine was a search that implicated the
protections of the Fourth Amendment. 2 Then, without considerable dis-
cussion, the court assumed the position of the City that Rutherford's po-
sition was safety sensitive.253 Consequently, the court looked to the spe-
cial needs doctrine to determine if it applied, possibly making the search
reasonable in the instant case.25
The Tenth Circuit determined that the nature of the intrusiveness of
the testing procedure was not in line with the testing procedures in Skin-
ner and Von Raab.255 The court concluded that the testing procedure at
issue was much more intrusive because the plaintiff was unaware of the
procedure and had no warning or advance notice.256 Intrusiveness was
magnified because Rutherford was not in an industry heavily regulated
for safety purposes, such as the railroad workers in Skinner.5 7 The court
seemed to overlook the size of the vehicle and danger of it on the road.58
Finally, the court noted that the government's interest to ensure safety
259was decidedly low in the instant case.
Furthermore, because Rutherford had not been at work in over a
year, the test was not a reflection of his activities at work, actions that
would increase the government's interest. 260 Because there was no notice,
and there were no public safety concerns akin to Von Raab, Rutherford
261had a high expectation of privacy that was violated by the test.
Another distinguishing factor that the court noted was a wide exer-
cise of discretion by city officials in testing Rutherford 22 He was not a
new employee and he maintained his operator's license for the City.263
Consequently, he was tested based on significant official discretion, not
under the rules of the City. 26 The court emphasized that this discretionwas lacking in both Skinner and Von Raab.6 5
251. Id. at 1260.
252. Id.
253. Rutherford, 77 F.3d at 1261.
254. Id. at 1261.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1262.
257. Id.
258. See International Broth. of Teamsters v. Dept. of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1304 (9th Cir.
1991) (discussing safety sensitive position of heavy truck drivers).
259. Rutherford, 77 F.3d at 1262.
260. Id. at 1263.
261. Id.
262. Id. at1261.
263. Id. at 1259.
264. Id. at 1261.
265. Rutherford, 77 F.3d at 1261.
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After distinguishing Supreme Court precedent, the court applied the
special needs balancing test.266 When the court balanced the interest of
the government and the level of intrusiveness, under the special needs
doctrine, the scales tipped decidedly for the individual.267
c. Holding
Rutherford's expectation of privacy outweighed the governmental
interest under the special needs doctrine. 26' Consequently the City had
violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
because the City had not established probable cause or individualized
suspicion .269
2. 19 Solid Waste Mechanics v. Albuquerque
270
19 Solid Waste Mechanics was decided after Chandler, and the de-
cision relied heavily on the analysis of Chandler to hold that a random
suspicionless testing policy did not warrant the application of the special
needs doctrine because the policy did nothing to deter behavior.
27'
a. Facts
City mechanics commenced this action to claiming random suspi-
cionless drug testing of city employees was unconstitutional. Testing
policy required urine drug testing for all employees whose jobs required
a commercial driver's license to be conducted when they renewed their
licenses. 273 Another policy required mechanics who worked on city vehi-
cles to have a commercial driver's license, which brought the employees
under the drug testing policy.
274
The City asserted that the mechanics were safety sensitive personnel
because the performance of their jobs could put others at risk, as they
worked on the brakes, steering, and other safety issues with city
vehicles.2 7' Then the City asserted that the special needs doctrine applied,
and that under previous Supreme Court precedent, governmental interest
outweighed privacy intrusion.276
266. Id. at 1262.
267. Id. at 1263.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 156 F.3d 1068 (1998).
271. 19 Solid Waste Mechanics v. Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1069, 1074 (1998).
272. 19 Solid Waste Mechanics, 156 F.3d at 1070.
273. Id. at 1071.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1074.
276. Id. at 1071.
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b. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit first concluded that there was state action by a
government employer, and that collecting urine for drug testing was a
search within the confines of the Fourth Amendment. 7 The remaining
questions were the reasonableness of the search and the application of
the special needs doctrine.278
Prior to completing the balancing test of the special needs doctrine,
the court ruled that the government was required to establish a special
need based on precedent in Chandler.279 There were two issues to deter-
mine if the government had shown a special need.280 First, did the gov-
ernment provide evidence of a real need that warranted the application of
the special needs doctrine? 2 ' Types of evidence accepted by the court
were the government showing that the testing program was adopted in
response to a documented drug problem or showing that the group being
'2
tested would pose a danger or threat to the public:. Second, was the
testing policy reasonably related to the goals of detection and deterrence
outside of law enforcement purposes allowing relaxation of the warrant
requirement?
2 3
If either of these factors is not established, the special needs doc-
trine would not apply, and there would have to be another exception to
the warrant and probable cause requirement to make the search reason-
able.2u
The court concluded that the City had failed to satisfy the second
factor, the deterrent effect, for the application of the special needs doc-
285trine. The policy lacked a capacity to address drug problems in the
workplace because the drivers would know when the test was coming
and could prepare for it, and tests were given very infrequently - only
286once every four years . For the Tenth Circuit, advance notice and fre-
quency were fatal to the policy.28 7 This sharply contrasts with the holding
of Rutherford a few years earlier where the court ruled that no advance
notice was fatal to a random suspicionless drug testing policy.
28
277. Id. at 1072.
278. 19 Solid Waste Mechanics, 156 F.3d at 1072.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1073.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1073.
284. 19 Solid Waste Mechanics, 156 F.3d at 1073.
285. Id. at 1074.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Rutherford, 77 F.3d at 1263.
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The court noted that the rationale for the program - safety - was
legitimate, despite not having documented evidence of the problem.289
Therefore, the government had great interest in performing the drug tests
to assure safety. 290 The court did not require that this be shown by docu-
mented evidence, but merely accepted it as fact.'9 The court stated that
the mechanics held a safety sensitive position and that safety was clearly
a concern, even without documentation.2 92 This satisfied the first factor
for the application of the special needs doctrine. 93
Consequently, because the City had not established a special need,
the special needs doctrine could not be applied.294
c. Holding
Random urine drug testing of city employees unconstitutionally
violated the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures because the government had not established a spe-
cial need.2 95
3. Earls v. Board of Education
29
6
Earls is the most recent of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sions concerning random suspicionless drug testing. This case differs
from the previous Tenth Circuit cases discussed because it is in the con-
text of a school, not employment. The court applied the precedent of
Vernonia in conjunction with 19 Solid Waste Mechanics, to hold that the
special needs doctrine did not apply because there was no real need
shown and the policy was both over and under broad.297
a. Facts
The school district implemented a random urine drug-testing pro-
gram for all students involved in extracurricular competitive activities to
help combat drug use at the schools.298 Activities covered under the pol-
icy included athletics (like Vernonia), but also included student choir,
band, color guard, Future Farmers of America, Future Homemakers of
299America, academic team, debate team, cheerleading, and pom pom.





294. Id. at 1074-75.
295. 19 Solid Waste Mechanics, 156 F.3d at 1074-75.
296. 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001).
297. Earls v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Tecumseh Public Sch. No. 92, 242 F.3d 1264, 1278 (10th Cir.
2001).
298. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1266.
299. Id. at 1267.
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Each student participating had to agree to the testing or she was not al-
lowed to participate. 3°°
Procedures of the test were almost identical to the intrusiveness of
the test in Vernonia.30' Tests only detected amphetamines, marijuana,
cocaine, opiates, barbiturates, and benzodiazepines, without testing for
alcohol and nicotine.0 2 Urine was collected behind closed stall doors
(similar to Vernonia), but in groups of two or three students.33
There was no mention of what happened to students with a positive
result, as opposed to Vernonia where a second test was completed. Re-
sults were put in a confidential file separate from the students' academic
record, and would only be released to school officials who had a need to
know test results, and would not be given to the police.
The District spent little time establishing the drug problems within
their specific district, and did not demonstrate that the policy was geared
toward the core of the drug culture.3 5
Parents, on behalf of their children, brought suit claiming a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
b. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit determined that Vernonia compelled the decision
that there was state action and that those actions constituted a search.3 In
addition, Vernonia compelled the application of the special needs doc-
trine. ' Although the court held that it was applying Vernonia, not 19
Solid Waste Mechanics, and holding that the school had established a
special need;0 their decision rested heavily on a lack of deterrence be-
cause of the lack of a documented problem, very similar to the analysis
310in 19 Solid Waste Mechanics.
The court examined the privacy interest of the students and the level
of intrusion on that interest."' The court concluded that the students
tested had a decreased expectation of privacy compared to other students
and adults, but departed from Vernonia by stating that the students in the
instant case did not have as low an expectation of privacy as the students
300. Id. at 1268.
301. Id. at 1276.
302. Id. at 1267.
303. Id.
304. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1268.
305. Id. at 1270.
306. Id. at 1268.
307. Id. at 1270.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1270 n.4.
310. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1272.
311. Id. at 1275.
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in Vernonia."' The court rejected arguments that the students' voluntary
participation in the activities decreased their expectation of privacy and
that all the included programs required communal undress and occa-
sional out of town trips decreasing the expectation of privacy.3" It did
state, however, that students who participated in after school activities
did have a lower expectation of privacy than other students.'
4
Then the court looked at the governmental interest and what the
government had established concerning the factors for the application of
the special needs doctrine." 5 The court concluded that the school had not
shown a sufficient drug problem that the drug testing policy would com-
bat.316 It reviewed the history of the testing results and concluded that a
large, epidemic drug problem did not exist in the District as shown in
Vernonia.31' In addition, the policy was not an effective deterrent because
it was both over and under broad; it tested students who did not have a
safety issue, and tested too few students within the District.3 8
Thus, the factors for the application of the special needs doctrine, a
real need and deterrence, were not satisfied." 9 Without these elements,
the expectation of privacy, no matter how slight, outweighed the interests
of the government.32 °
c. Holding
Random suspicionless urine drug testing policy, as a precursor to
participation in any competitive after school activity, was unconstitu-
tional and constituted an unreasonable search because the special needs
doctrine did not apply.33'
The United States Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari for
Earls but the decision had not been issued at the time this article was
322
written.
312. Id. at 1275-76.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1276.
315. Id. at 1276-77.
316. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1277.
317. Id. at 1272-75.
318. Id. at 1277.
319. Id. at 1278.
320. Id. at 1277.
321. Id. at 1279.
322. Bd. of Edu. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 509, 2001 WL 1046942
(2001). Oral arguments were heard on March 19, 2002. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Weighs
Expanded Drug Testing for Students, DENVER POST, March 20, 2002, at A5.
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III. THE DEMISE OF THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE IN THE TENTH
CIRCUIT
A. Only Reasonable Suspicion Drug Tests Survive
The Tenth Circuit has upheld urine drug testing policies only twice
in the past, and in both of these cases, the court held that there was indi-
vidualized suspicion, which allowed a warrantless search.323
1. Saaverda v. Albuquerque
324
a. Facts
Saaverda was a firefighter and emergency technician for the City of
Albuquerque.32 In 1991, Saaverda suffered physical and emotional
problems to an extent that he self-referred himself to the city's employee
health center.326 When he was at the center, he provided a urine sample.327
When tested, the sample was proved to be solely water.328 A second urine
test was completed, and this one tested positive for drugs.329 After a pre-
termination hearing, he was released from employment due to the posi-
tive drug test.3 Saaverda then sought judicial review of his termination
arguing, among other challenges, that his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated by the random suspicionless drug test.'
The City argued that it was not random, nor suspicionless, but that
they had reasonable suspicion because of earlier threats he had made,
332explosive fighting in public, and the initial urine test being water.
b. Analysis
The court very briefly went over the special needs doctrine, and
then dismissed that justification.333 The court believed that the City did
have reasonable suspicion, and if they had reasonable suspicion, they
need not apply the special needs doctrine.33 Independent of the special
needs doctrine, reasonable suspicion in a non-law enforcement context
provided an exception from the warrant requirement.
33
323. See discussion infra Part III.A.
324. 73 F.3d 1525 (10th Cir. 1996).
325. Saaverda v. Albuquerque, 73 F.3d 1525, 1527 (10th Cir. 1996).





331. Id. at 1528.
332. Saaverda, 73 F.3d at 1528.
333. Id. at 1532.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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The court agreed with the City that reasonable suspicion had been
justified by Saaverda's previous actions prior to the drug test, and the fact
that he gave a sample of water for his first urine test.
336
As a result, there was no need to apply the special needs doctrine,
and the court chose not to, merely answering the constitutionality of a
drug testing policy as it applied to Saaverda, not addressing the question
of whether random drug testing was constitutional.337
c. Holding
Suspicion based drug testing in the instant case was constitutional
because there was individualized suspicion.338
2. Benavidez v. Albuquerque
339
a. Facts
Benavidez was a field service operator for the City's Public Works
Department.3° He and his supervisor drove to another employees house
in a company vehicle.TM ' He went into the house to buy drugs while his
supervisor waited in the car, drinking beer." 2 Unfortunately for
Benavidez, it was a drug bust. 3' Both he and his supervisor were de-
tained, but not arrested.3"
When they were released, the police notified their supervisor and
explained that they had been questioned during a drug raid and that
Benavidez stated that he was there to purchase cocaine. 3 The City then
questioned Benavidez and his supervisor at length, but no drug test was
conducted because they did not appear to be impaired by alcohol con-
sumption.' However, 36 hours later, they were tested.37 Benavidez
tested negative, but his supervisor tested positive.3M
Both were terminated.349 Both filed suit claiming, among other
things, a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
search and seizure.3 °
336. Id. at 1531.
337. Id. at 1532.
338. Saaverda, 73 F.3d at 1532.
339. 101 F.3d 620 (10th Cir. 1996).
340. Benavidez v. Albuquerque, 101 F.3d 620, 622 (10th Cir. 1996).
341. Benavidez, 101 F.3d at 622.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 623.
345. Id.
346. Id.
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b. Analysis
The court addressed the special needs doctrine, but dismissed it as
not applicable.35' The court looked to whether the City had a reasonable
suspicion and an individualized suspicion. Based on the amount of
information and its reliability, having come from the police, the informa-
tion the City received about their drug involvements constituted reason-
able suspicion.353 There did not have to be direct observation that an em-
ployee's ability to perform their job was impaired.35
The City established reasonable suspicion, so the special needs
doctrine did not apply.3 5 The court refused to inquire further into the
drug testing policy of the City, especially the level of suspicion needed
by administrative order, because administrative order violations would
not give rise to a § 1983 claim, which was the jurisdiction claimed by the
plaintiffs.356
c. Holding
There was reasonable suspicion to make a warrantless search rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment.357 There was no need to analyze
the special needs doctrine.358
B. No Suspicionless Drug Tests Have Survived Special Needs Analysis
No case concerning suspicionless drug testing policies presented to
the Tenth Circuit has survived their "special needs" analysis. Each of the
three cases outlined above that have addressed the issue has invalidated
the policy on three different grounds: lack of notice, lack of deterrence
because of notice, and lack of proof of a real problem of drug use at a
particular school district.359 In each of these cases, the court strayed its
precedent and the United States Supreme Court.
1. Lack of Notice
The Rutherford court emphasized that Rutherford had no notice of
the drug testing policy, and that increased his expectation of privacy
making the test over intrusive.36 Since that decision, both the Supreme
Court and the Tenth Circuit have essentially overruled Rutherford, with-
350. Id.
351. Id. at 624.
352. Id.
353. Benavidez, 101 F.3d at 624.
354. Id. at 625.
355. Id. at 624.
356. Id. at 625.
357. Id. at 624.
358. Id.
359. See discussion supra Part H.B.
360. Rutherford, 77 F.3d at 1262.
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out expressly doing so, by holding that advance notice is fatal to the de-
terrence of the testing policy.3 6 ' Relying on the fact that individuals could
give a false sample, or a clean sample, if they knew when the test was
going to occur, the Tenth Circuit in 19 Solid Waste Mechanics struck
down the policy because it could not effectively deter or ferret out a drug
problem.362 The Court in Chandler invalidated a policy on similar
grounds. 3
However, Rutherford still stands as law, having not been
overruled.36 Thus, in the Tenth Circuit, notice can be fatal to a testing
policy, either because it reduces the deterrent factor or because it elevates
the intrusiveness of the test.
2. Societal Drug Problems Are Not Real
In striking down the urine drug testing policy, the Earls court found
another way to invalidate the special needs doctrine, and in doing so ig-
nored precedent by both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit. In
Earls, there was minimum notice, the students knew about the testing
policy, but not when they were going to be tested.3 65 This appears to be
just enough notice, the midline between Rutherford's lack of notice and
19 Solid Waste Mechanics too much advance notice. Consequently, it
was a good deterrent.
The Tenth Circuit revisited the first factor for application of special
needs doctrine, the establishment a real need through documented evi-
dence.- Unfortunately for the school, the government attorneys had not
proven any significant drug problem. Inherent in the court's rationale
was that if the school could not prove it, there must not be a drug prob-
lem. If there was no drug problem, then there was no real need, and the
special needs doctrine did not apply.
Fatal to the court's reasoning, and presumably what the school was
relying on, was that in 19 Solid Waste Mechanics, Rutherford, and all of
the previous Supreme Court cases, drug problems were stated to be ma-
jor social problems, one that court often assumed needed to be dealt
withY7 19 Solid Waste Mechanics went almost as far as to say no proof
of drug problems was needed to satisfy the real need of the special needs
doctrine." Consequently, despite prior statements by the court that drug
problems were a major societal safety problem that needed to be con-
361. See id
362. 19 Solid Waste Mechanics, 156 F.3d at 1074.
363. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 320.
364. See Rutherford v. Albuquerque, 77 F.3d 1258 (1996).
365. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1267.
366. Id. at 1272. But see id. at 1270 n.4.
367. See 19 Solid Waste Mechanics, 156 F.3d at 1074; Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319; Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 674; T.LO., 469 U.S. at 339,
368. 19 Solid Waste Mechanics, 156 F.3d at 1074.
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trolled, and despite Supreme Court decisions to the same, the court
wanted a way to invalidate the policy.
The Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court had already decided the
issue of notice and deterrence; the court needed another "out." The only
way the court could dissolve the policy was to eliminate the special
needs doctrine by holding that the school did not show a real need. To do
this, the court relied on the Supreme Court in Vernonia expounding on
the major problems drugs had brought to that school as evidence of a
major drug problem proved by that District.369
3. Net Effects of the Courts Analysis
It appears that the Tenth Circuit strongly opposes any relaxing of
the protections of the Fourth Amendment.370 In fact, the court has only
accepted the relaxing of the Fourth Amendment under the special needs
doctrine in two circumstances - searches of individuals in prisons with
the governmental need of running and operating a prison safely,37' and
searches of homes and persons of parolees by parole officers.372 It ap-
pears that the Tenth Circuit rarely allows suspicionless searches, relying
mainly on a minimum benchmark of individualized suspicion for the
search to be constitutionally reasonable. This is bolstered by the fact that
the only cases concerning urine drug testing to survive the Tenth Circuit
have been based on individualized suspicion and no random suspicion-
less drug testing has been upheld as constitutional.373
The Tenth Circuit has chosen a rights-based approach, protecting
the rights and liberties of individuals, instead of a more utilitarian ap-
proach, providing the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In
addition, the Tenth Circuit narrowly limits other exceptions to the war-
rant requirement for administrative searches.374 This shows increased
protections for individuals' liberties and rights.
In the context of urine drug searches,375 and other Fourth Amend-
ment contexts,376 the United States Supreme Court has a more utilitarian
369. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1270-71.
370. See discussion supra Part I.A.
371. See Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013 (10th Cit. 1995) (applying "special needs doctrine"
to warrantless search of visitors to prisons).
372. See United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying "special needs
doctrine" to waive warrant requirement for probation officer to search probationer's home).
373. See discussion supra Part V.
374. See Jennifer D. Sheehan, Limiting the Closely Regulated Business Exception to the
Warrant Requirement: V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming, Department of Environmental Quality, 902 F.2d
1482 (10th Cir. 1990), 39 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 277, 286-88 (1991) (discussing Tenth
Circuit limits on administrative searches to closely regulated industries with stringent authorizing
statutes).
375. See Kenneth C. Betts, Fourth Amendment - Suspicionless Urinalysis Testing: A
Constitutionally "Reasonable" Weapon in the Nations War on Drugs? National Treasury Union v.
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jurisprudence, relaxing the protections offered to the individual for the
benefit of society. This is exemplified by the Supreme Court repeatedly
carving out exception after exception to the warrant requirement for the
protection and safety of the public at large.377
Since the decision of Vernonia, the circuits have split on the con-
stitutionality of similar urine drug testing policies of students. The Sev-
enth Circuit has held virtually all policy as constitutional, relying almost
solely on the holding in Vernonia.37 s The split in the circuits makes this a
prime time for the United States Supreme Court to try to clear up the
issue, especially the requirements for the application of the special needs
doctrine. Presumably, the Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari
for Earls to address this split.
Until the Supreme Court affirmatively sets the guidelines for the
applicability requirements of the special needs doctrine, and gives more
guidance for the balancing weight to be given to each factor in the spe-
cial needs balancing test, the Tenth Circuit should be more consistent
with the philosophy of utilitarianism expressed by the Supreme Court. In
order to do this, the Tenth Circuit could adjust the balancing test by giv-
ing more weight during the balancing to society's needs and more weight
to protecting the people from the dangers of drug use and addiction. This
should bring the courts decisions more consistent with the expressed
philosophy of the United States Supreme Court.
Although there are factual differences in any case, and courts have
ruled that Fourth Amendment challenges should be done on a case-by-
case basis,379 the Tenth Circuit should not skirt the importance of prece-
dent. The court should lower students' expectation of privacy and lower
the expectation of privacy of individuals employed in highly regulated
industries. In recognizing the importance of the government's purpose, as
the court did in 19 Solid Waste Mechanics, and recognizing the de-
creased expectations of privacy, as the court did in Earls, the court
should have the same balancing results as the Supreme Court. The court
should not look to any factor possible to strike down the policies, espe-
Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989), 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1018, 1051 (1990) (discussing
United States Supreme Court's relaxing of individual protections for drug testing).
376. See Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the Good Cop and the Inadequacy of Fourth
Amendment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt, 23 CAP. U.
L. REv. 151, 163-65 (1994) (describing the Court's adoption of a utilitarian rationale for the
exclusionary rule instead of a rights-based or judicial integrity rationale).
377. See Myron Schreck, The Fourth Amendment in the Public Schools: Issues for the 1990s
and Beyond, 25 URB. LAW. 117, 118-19 (1993) (discussing various cases carving out exceptions to
the wan-ant and probable cause requirements).
378. See Jennifer Smiley, Rethinking the "Special Needs" Doctrine: Suspicionless Drug
Testing of High School Students and Narrowing of the Fourth Amendment Protections, 95 Nw. U.L.
REv. 811,827 (2001).
379 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665.
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cially if prior decisions, either in the Tenth Circuit or the United States
Supreme Court, have eliminated or lessened the importance of that fac-
tor.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has made its stance on random
urine drug testing very clear.'s The court will capitalize on any opportu-
nity to protect individuals from what the court considers an unreasonable
search and seizure. The court has found these policies to be unconstitu-
tional for a wide variety of sometimes conflicting reasons - because
there was no notice, too much notice, no special need shown, no signifi-
cant deterrent effect, or an over or under broad policy.38' In sum the spe-
cial needs doctrine will probably not apply, and if it is applied, the bal-
ancing test will favor the individual's expectation of privacy.
The court manifests this position by expanding individuals' expec-
tations of privacy which often ignore prior dicta and precedent from both
the Tenth Circuit's and the United States Supreme Court's opinions .1 2 In
doing so, the Tenth Circuit has all but eliminated the constitutional sus-
picionless search aspect of the special needs doctrine, relying only on the
individualized suspicion doctrine as an exception to the warrant require-
ment.38 3 The court does this in a rights-basis effort to hold individualized
suspicion as the minimum suspicion level required for a warrantless
search.
Matthew A. Pring
380. See discussion supra Part II.
381. See discussion supra Part II.
382. See discussion supra Part III.
383. See id.
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